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This paper seeks to determine the macro-economic 
impacts of migration of skilled medical personnel 
from a receiving country’s perspective. The resource 
allocation issues are explored in theory, by developing 
an extension of the Rybczynski theorem in a low-
dimension Heckscher-Ohlin framework, and empirically, 
by developing a static computable general equilibrium 
model for the United Kingdom with an extended health 
sector component. Using simple diagrams, an expansion 
of the health sector by recruiting immigrant skilled 
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workers in certain cases is shown to compare favorably 
to the (short-term) long-term alternative of using 
domestic (unskilled) workers. From a formal analysis, 
changes in non-health outputs are shown to depend on 
factor-bias and scale effects. The net effects generally are 
indeterminate. The main finding from the applied model 
is that importing foreign doctors and nurses into the 
United Kingdom yields higher overall welfare gains than 
a generic increase in the National Health Service budget. 
Welfare gains rise in case of wage protection.  
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Health workers migrate from developing to developed countries to better their 
economic or social situation immediately or for the purpose of career development. 
The incentives to migrate typically involve a combination of “push factors” 
(unsatisfactory working or living conditions in the country of origin) and “pull 
factors” (attractive working or living conditions, availability of positions and active 
recruitment in the country of destination). While individual motives underlie the 
observed migration flows – and in this sense are neither new nor unique to the health 
sector as such – the so-called medical “brain drain” causes the unique problem of 
severe workforce shortages in developing country health systems that are already 
under stress (Chen et al., 2004; Dovlo, 2005).
i A notable difference with the past is 
that medical migration and the accompanying shortage of health personnel for 
developing countries are now usually permanent.
ii Faced with a dwindling work 
force, the task facing developing countries in building up their health care syste
particularly daunting. This is the more so for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
suffering the HIV/AIDS pandemic, which uses up much of health and medical service 
capacity 
ms is 
and claims the lives of many health workers.
iii  
Eastwood et al. (2005) and Buchan and Dovlo (2004) suggest that the UK 
plays a major role in the medical brain drain from (especially English-speaking) 
countries in SSA. Obvious pull factors are that (1) English is an increasingly 
international language and (2) the shortage of UK-trained doctors and nurses makes 
immediately available and qualified substitutes an attractive alternative. While the 
UK’s Code of Practice for International Recruitment may have had a dampening 
effect on the recruitment of foreign doctors and nurses,
iv it can be expected that the 
UK will continue to recruit medical migrants given its continued strong demand for health care, its ageing health work force and increasingly globalized labor markets, 
especially once progress is made in the negotiations on Mode 4 of the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) of the WTO.
v  
This paper analyzes the economic consequences of migration of skilled 
medical personnel from a receiving country’s perspective, taking the UK as an 
archetypal OECD economy that imports medical services.
vi The focus on medical 
migration allows us to analyze the associated positive health consequences for 
developed countries, such as the UK, whose health care systems are rationed by 
limited public funding, an aspect which has not been explicitly modeled before. The 
analyses developed in this paper can nonetheless also be extended to the sending 
country perspective and clearly have a mirror image in terms of the associated adverse 
health consequences for many developing countries, particularly in SSA, that already 
suffer from severe medical workforce shortages.  
The paper adds to the existing literature on the economic impacts of increased 
worldwide migration
vii by its focus on the international movement of skilled health 
personnel. The existing applied literature unequivocally finds considerable global 
welfare gains, as workers flow from low productivity areas (developing countries) to 
high productivity areas (developed countries), yielding a rise in world output 
(Bhatnagar, 2004). In addition, poorer developing regions stand to gain especially 
from increased temporary unskilled labor emigration due to their relative abundance 
in this factor, the relatively large size of the productivity gap between home and host 
countries for this type of labor, the benefits from acquired skills and experience 
available for use upon return and the remittances sent home. Temporary migration has 
the additional benefit to the (developed) receiving regions of avoiding the political 
costs associated with permanent migration. However, as previously noted for the health sector, the migration of skilled workers usually entails a permanent loss of 
already scarce human capital in the developing country of origin, i.e. a brain drain, 
with adverse consequences for service delivery and outcomes, and for welfare.
viii So, 
while economic models suggest that the migration of unskilled workers leads to 
welfare gains across the globe, the impact of the migration of skilled workers on 
global welfare is a lot less clear.
ix  
The analysis is novel in two main respects. The first contribution is an 
extension of the standard Rybczynski (R) Theorem (Rybczynski, 1955). While there 
is a strong literature on endogenous labor supply models (e.g. Martin, 1976; Martin 
and Neary, 1980), these have in the main been based on direct labor supply responses 
to higher wages. Here, changes in effective labor supplies come from changes in the 
size of the health sector. The paper presents the effects of a health sector expansion on 
sectoral outputs in the long-term, where the health sector expansion is driven by an 
increase in the use of domestic skilled and unskilled labor, and in the short-term, 
where skilled workers in the health sector have health-specific skills so that an 
increase in health output is driven by either an increase in the use of unskilled labor 
only or also the importing of foreign skilled medical workers. 
The second contribution is in terms of empirics, by developing a static 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model for the UK with a detailed health 
component. The CGE model is calibrated to a purpose-built Social Accounting Matrix 
(SAM) for the year 2000 with considerable refinement in terms of sectors 
(distinguishing health care and its main input suppliers), factors (capital, skilled and 
unskilled labor) and household types (based on age and labor market participation of 
household members). It is the first of its kind in that it has been designed to analyze 
the macro-economic impacts of changes in health care provision, whilst recognizing the simultaneous effects of changes in health on effective labor supplies and the 
resource claims made by the health sector. The effects on welfare of higher health 
provision come through two main channels: (a) the direct gain from increasing the 
“well-being” of the population, and (b) the indirect effects of an increase in the size of 
the effective (i.e. “able to work”) endowments of skilled and unskilled labor for use in 
non-health activities. The model is employed in two “rationed” health care policy 
simulations. Specifically, the policies of a generic increase in the National Health 
Service (NHS) budget and the recruitment of foreign doctors and nurses at the current 
wage are contrasted with one another. We assume that doctors and nurses are 
immobile across sectors and, for the purpose of comparability, that the policies have 
identical nominal NHS budget implications. In order to illustrate the social welfare 
effects of medical wage protection following immigration we also report the results of 
the immigration policy when wages of doctors and nurses are allowed to fall. 
 
2. Medical Migration into the UK: Some Low-Dimension Analytics 
To provide some intuition in support of the subsequent formal analysis we start with a 
simplified diagrammatic representation of the interrelationships between the level of 
health provision, the number of workers treated successfully and so returning to work, 
and the outputs of two an export and an import good. The approach is based on that 
commonly used in the explanation of ‘R effects’ in the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson 
(HOS) model
x following exogenous changes in factor endowments.  
The R theorem predicts that at constant product prices, and hence constant 
factor prices, and with factors of production that are perfectly mobile between 
domestic sectors, an exogenous increase in the endowment of only one factor leads to 
an increase in output in the sector that is intensive in the increased factor and a decrease in the output of the other sector.
xi Here, however, we are concerned with 
changes in factor endowments that are endogenously determined in that the 
government decides on, and finances, the size of the non-tradable health sector. An 
increase in the size of that sector reduces the factor endowments available to the 
tradables production sectors directly. However, it also increases those endowments 
indirectly by treating people who were previously on the ‘waiting list’ for health care, 
i.e. people currently unable to work due to ill health, leading to a range of possible 
outcomes.  
A further complication is that most (for simplicity we assume all) of the 
skilled workers in the health sector have health-specific skills that take time to acquire 
and are not readily transferable to other domestic sectors. This implies that in the 
short-term the health sector can only expand by using more unskilled labor or by 
recruiting skilled workers with health-specific skills from other countries. In this case 
the standard ‘R effects’ in the HOS model must be modified, and the analysis 
becomes closer to that of the Specific Factors model (Jones, 1971).  
 
A Possible Initial Equilibrium 
Figure 1 shows a ‘factor endowment box’, defined by the south-west and north-east 
corners,   a n d    respectively. The vertical and horizontal dimensions measure 
the total endowments of skilled labor (S) and unskilled labor ( ) respectively. 
Inputs of skilled and unskilled labor to the health sector are measured from , and 
the numbers of skilled and unskilled workers unable to work (on the ‘waiting list’ for 
health care) are measured from . The skilled and unskilled workers available to 
work in the tradables sectors 1 and 2 are thus shown by the dimensions of the inner 
factor box, identified by the south-west and north-east corners,   and 






2respectively. Labor inputs to tradables sector 1 are measured from   and those to 
tradables sector 2 from  . For simplicity it is assumed that, at the given factor 
prices, the health sector has the same skill intensity as the economy, and that the 
incidence of illness, the provision of treatment and the responsiveness to that 
treatment are identical for all workers. Thus the north-east corner of the ‘health box’ 
and the south-west corner of the ‘waiting list box’ lie on the diagonal of the total 











INSERT Figure 1 Here 
In the initial equilibrium the health sector employs   and   of skilled and 
unskilled labor respectively. These provide a health output that treats ill workers to 
the extent that numbers   and   of skilled and unskilled labor remain on the 
waiting list and hence are unable to work. Thus the numbers of skilled and unskilled 
labor available to work in the tradables sectors are S  and 
 respectively, these being the dimensions of the factor box defined 
by   and  . The given relative factor prices determine the skill intensities in the 
two tradables sectors (sector 1 being the more skill-intensive), and the intersection of 
the rays   a n d    at point a determines the full employment outputs of 
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Expanding the Health Sector Using Only Unskilled Domestic Workers 
Figure 2 illustrates the effects of an expansion of the health sector using only 
domestic unskilled workers (the endowment of health-specific skilled workers 
remaining at  H S ). The changes (indicated by a #) result in a new tradables 
equilibrium at point b. The supply of skilled workers to the tradables sectors necessarily increases, but the supply of unskilled workers rises if the fall in the 
waiting list exceeds the increased use of unskilled labor in the health sector and falls 
otherwise. 
INSERT Figure 2 Here 
Given the assumption that the incidence of illness, the provision of treatment 
and the responsiveness to that treatment are identical for all workers, the output of 
sector 1 necessarily increases. The output of sector 2 will decrease, unless the growth 
in the supply of unskilled workers to the tradables sectors is large enough to 
overcome the reduction effect of the expansion of the supply of skilled workers. 
These results depend on, inter alia, the ‘efficiency’ of the health sector in treating and 
curing workers who are on the health care waiting list. For example, a neutral 
improvement in health sector technology will further increase the output of sector 1 
and reduce the likelihood of a decrease in sector 2 output. The increase in the ratio of 
unskilled to skilled workers in the health sector implies that the marginal product and 
hence the real wage of the skilled workers increases. 
 
Expanding the Health Sector by Importing Workers with Health-Specific Skills 
The alternative short-term method of expanding the health sector is to recruit workers 
with equivalent health-specific skills from other countries. This increases the vertical 
dimension of the economy’s factor box, which is shown in Figure 3 by extending its 
vertical dimension downwards. The changes (indicated by a +) result in a new 
tradables equilibrium at point c. Figure 3 has been drawn on the assumption that the 
immigrant skilled workers are paid the same wage as their domestic counterparts and 
that the wage does not change, so that the skill intensity in the health sector will be 
unchanged. This implies that the government increases the health budget to the extent needed to maintain the initial skilled wage.  Moreover, it is assumed that the 
recruitment of skilled workers is that which will result in the same increase in the 
employment of unskilled workers in the health sector as in the previous case. 
INSERT Figure 3 Here 
The increase in the employment of skilled workers in the health sector, with 
the same increase in unskilled labor, expands its output compared to the previous 
case, and so results in greater reductions in the waiting lists. As a consequence, there 
is a greater increase in the supply of skilled labor to the tradables sectors, and a 
smaller fall (greater rise) in that of unskilled labor. Thus the output of sector 1 will 
increase by more than previously, while that of sector 2 will fall by less (or increase 
by more). Hence, in the current setup, the expansion of the health sector by recruiting 
immigrant skilled workers has favorable implications for the outputs of the two 




Expanding the Health Sector by Using More Skilled and Unskilled Domestic Workers 
Figure 4 shows the consequences of an expansion of the health sector using both 
domestic skilled and unskilled workers but no immigrant labor with health-specific 
skills, a situation representative of the long-term. To facilitate comparison with the 
health sector expansion using immigrant skilled labor, the expansion of the health 
service is assumed to involve the same increase in skilled labor as the importation of 
immigrant skilled labor, and the same increase in the use of unskilled labor. This 
implies that the reductions in the waiting lists are the same. The changes (indicated by 
a *) result in a new tradables equilibrium at point d. 
INSERT Figure 4 Here Compared to the previous scenario, the supply of skilled labor to the tradables 
sectors increases by less and that of unskilled labor remains the same. As a 
consequence, the output of sector 1 will increase by less than previously, while that of 
sector 2 will fall by more (or increase by less). Hence, in the current setup the 
expansion of the health sector in the short-term by recruiting immigrant skilled 
workers also has favorable implications for the outputs of the two tradables sectors 
compared to an expansion in the long-term using domestic workers only. 
 Abandoning the simplifying assumption that the skill-intensity of the health 
sector is identical to the skilled-unskilled national endowment ratio complicates the 
analysis, but reference to the standard R results gives us some insight. For example, if 
the health sector is more skill-intensive than that assumed, then an expansion of that 
sector will reduce the skilled-unskilled ratio of the workers available to the tradables 
sectors. This will reduce the size of the skill-intensive sector 1 and increase the size of 
the other sector relative to that shown in Figure 4. 
The diagrammatic analysis is useful in identifying the varied effects of 
different ways of expanding of the health sector on the effective endowments of labor 
and the outputs of the other production sectors. However, it is limited in that there are 
a number of possible cases, the consideration of which would require multiple 
diagrams. To remedy this, we use the standard proportional change analysis to derive 
the changes in sectoral outputs in a more general setting.  
 
The Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson Model 
The full employment conditions for the two factors are 
   SH + S1 + S2 = SE = S − SW        ( 1 )  
        ( 2 )   12 HE UU U UU U ++= = − Wwhere   and   are the effective endowments of skilled and unskilled labor. The 
amount of factor k  used in producing one unit of output in sector i,  , is 
determined by the ratio of the given wages,   for skilled labor,   for unskilled 
labor. If the outputs of the three sectors are 





X , ,1,2 iH = , then we may write (1) and 
(2) as 
      (3)  11 22 SH H S S E W aXa X aXSS S ⋅+ ⋅ +⋅ = = −
      (4)  11 22 UH H U U E W aXa X aX U U U ⋅+⋅ +⋅ == −
Total differentiation of (3) and (4), and adopting the small country assumption so that 
 and  , and thus factor intensities, are exogenously determined, yields  S w U w
  11 22ˆ ˆˆ ˆ
SH H S S E X XX λλ λ ⋅+ ⋅ +⋅ = S
ˆ
      ( 5 )  
  11 22 ˆˆ ˆ
UH H U U E X XX λλ λ ⋅+⋅ +⋅ = U     (6) 
where  λSi = aSi ⋅ Xi SE , λUi = aUi ⋅ Xi UE ,  λSi i ∑ = λUi i ∑ =1 and  ˆ
ii i X dX X = . 
Suppose that the government finances the provision of health care via a lump-
sum transfer, T , from the representative household. The cost of health care provision 
is given by the product of the number of units of health delivered and the cost per 
unit: 
           ( 7 )   HH TpX =⋅
where  H p  is determined by the unit cost of provision: 
  HS S H U U H p wa wa =⋅ +⋅        ( 8 )  
A change in health care expenditure implies that  , but with 
exogenously determined wages 
ˆ ˆH Tp X =+ ˆ
H
ˆ 0 H p = , so that  ˆˆ
H X T = . We can now solve (5) and 
(6) as   () () 122 2 2
ˆ 1 ˆ ˆˆ
UESE U H S S H U
T
XS U λλ λ λ λ λ
λ λ
=⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅  (9) 
  () () 21 1 1 1
ˆ 1 ˆ ˆˆ
SE UE S U HS H U
T
XU S λλ λ λ λ λ
λ λ
=⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅    (10) 
where  12 21 0 SU SU λλλ λ λ =⋅−⋅>  under the assumption that sector 1 is skill-
intensive relative to sector 2.  
Changes in the health budget will lead to changes in the waiting list for skilled 
labor and thus in its effective (able to work) endowment. Since  E SS S W = −  and the 
overall skill endowment is fixed ( 0 dS = ), we have  E dS dSW = −  as a consequence of 
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where the term in parentheses is the elasticity of the skilled labor waiting list with 
respect to health output,  S
H ε . Dividing though by   allows us to write the 
proportionate change   as 
E S
ˆ SE
          ( 1 1 )   ˆ ˆ S
EH S W S εδ =⋅ ⋅ H X
where  0 SW W E SS δ =>
ˆ
H X
 is the ratio of skilled labor on the waiting list to the 
effective skilled labor endowment, which may be interpreted as the ‘dependency 
ratio’ for skilled labor. Similarly we may write the proportionate change in the 
effective endowment of unskilled labor following a change in health output as 
          ( 1 2 )   ˆ U
EH U W U εδ =⋅ ⋅
where  S
H ε  is the elasticity of the unskilled labor waiting list with respect to health 
output and  0 UW W E UU δ =>  is the ‘dependency ratio’ for unskilled labor.  Remembering that  ˆ
H ˆ X T =  we may rewrite (9) and (10) as 
  () 12 2 2 2
ˆ
ˆ SU
U H SW S H UW UH S SH U
T
X λε δ λε δ λλ λλ
λ
=⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅⋅   (13) 
  () 21 1 1 1
ˆ
ˆ US
SH U WUH S W SU H S H U
T
X λεδ λεδ λλ λ λ
λ
=⋅ ⋅− ⋅ ⋅− ⋅+⋅⋅  (14) 
For simplicity we focus on the outcome when skilled and unskilled labor are 
homogenous in health status in that  SU
HH ε εε = =  and  SW UW δ δδ = = , so that after 
further manipulation of terms, (13) and (14) become 
   
ö X1 = ö X1
S + ö X1
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ö T
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The first terms in these expressions represent the scale effects, ˆ S
i X , of the 
expansion of the health sector, which depend directly on factor intensities in the 
tradables sectors. Specifically, if sector 1 has a skilled/unskilled ratio that is higher 
than the skilled/unskilled effective endowment ratio then  1 SU 1 λ λ > , while if sector 2 
has a skilled/unskilled ratio that is lower than the skilled/unskilled effective 
endowment ratio then  2 SU 2 λ λ < . In that case   and  . 1 ˆ 0 S X > 2 ˆ 0
S X >
xiii   
The second terms represent the factor bias effects,  ˆ F
i X , where the differences 
in factor intensities between the health sector and the identified tradables sectors play 
a part. Specifically, if  2 SH UH S U2 λ λλ λ > , i.e. the health sector is more skill-
intensive than tradables sector 2, then the factor bias effect will decrease the output of 
tradables sector 1, and conversely, while if  1 S U1 SH UH λλ λ > , i.e. the health sector  λis more skill-intensive than tradables sector 1, then the factor bias effect will increase 
the output of tradables sector 2.
xiv  
The net effect of the factor bias and scale effects in the HOS model with a 
non-tradable health sector in which endowments are endogenous depends on the sign 
and relative size of the factor bias and scale effects. Table 1 shows that the net effects 
are in general indeterminate, depending on the factor intensity rankings and the 
‘efficiency’ of the health sector in treating and curing sick workers.  
INSERT Table 1 Here 
All cases shown in Table 1 are representative of the long-term, since skilled 
and unskilled workers are fully mobile. Introducing health-specific skilled workers 
complicates the analysis by introducing separate effective endowments, waiting lists 
and wages for health-specific and other skilled workers respectively. The added 
complexities obscure the derivation of the R theorem (where the health sector 
expansion would be driven by an increase in the use of domestic unskilled workers) 
and the derivation of the impacts of the importation of health-specific skilled workers 
on the proportionate changes in outputs of tradables.
xv Combined with the absence of 
real-life complexities, such as more sectors, factors of production and households, a 
tax-charging and transfer- and public good-providing government, intermediate 
inputs, remittances of migrant workers and welfare gains from health sector 
provisioning, this provides a strong argument for the use of an applied model.  
 
3. Model Simulations and Results: Reducing Rationing in UK Health Care 
The model used in this study is a comparative static CGE model of the UK economy. 
The SAM underlying the model has been constructed by augmenting the UK Input-
Output Supply and Use Tables for 2000 with data from the General Household Survey for 2000-01.
xvi The CGE model has in most respects a standard structure, the 
novelty coming from the explicit modeling of the health sector, comprising public 
(NHS) and private health care, and its interaction with the rest of the economy 
through its differential impact across sectors, factors and household types (specified 
in Table 2).
xvii 
INSERT Table 2 
Setting Up the Model Experiments 
We employ the model in two types of experiments, both targeted at alleviating 
rationing in UK health care, and both observed in reality. Firstly we examine the 
impact of importing medical services, i.e. skilled health personnel, consisting of 
doctors and nurses (experiment 1). On entering the UK, foreign doctors and nurses are 
assumed to become part of the existing domestic household structure, i.e. they are 
perfect substitutes for their domestic equivalents. This assumption takes into account 
that many of them plan to stay and will thus become permanent UK households in the 
long-term. Furthermore, their wages are maintained at pre-immigration levels so that 
domestic workers are not worse off as a consequence of the policy. This assumption is 
representative of the UK situation, given that wages of health workers in the UK are 
essentially fixed in bilateral bargaining rounds between the Department of Health 
(constrained by the Treasury) and the medical profession (represented by, among 
others, the British Medical Association). However, in order to illustrate the welfare 
implications of wage protection of the medical profession, we subsequently consider 
the impact of allowing the wage of skilled health workers to fall. The experiment uses 
three alternative assumptions regarding the share of foreign worker income remitted 
abroad, adopting illustrative values of 0%, 50% and 100% respectively.
xviii Varying 
the share of migrant income remitted will have differential welfare implications since remittances have to be compensated for by a rise in exports and/or a fall in imports so 
as to maintain the balance of payments.
xix 
Secondly, we consider the alternative policy of increasing government health 
expenditures, so that not only more doctors and nurses, but also more of other skilled 
workers (technicians, managers), unskilled workers (hospital ward assistants, 
ambulance staff, ancillary workers), capital (electronic machinery, land, buildings) 
and intermediate inputs (pharmaceuticals and medical instruments) can be bought 
(experiment 2).  
For the purpose of comparability, we carry out the two experiments so that 
they will have identical implications for the nominal government budget on health 
care (i.e. the NHS budget). In experiment 1, it is assumed that an equivalent of 10% 
of the current domestic endowments of doctors and nurses takes up the chance to 
migrate to the UK, so that the NHS budget has to rise by 12.8% (approximately £6.9 
billion) to maintain their wages at the pre-immigration levels in the UK health sector. 
This budget increase is taken as the point of departure for experiment 2.
xx 
Since we expect that alleviating the shortage of health personnel and medical 
services in general – as evident from, for example, long waiting lists and, relative to 
other OECD countries, poor health outcomes in some areas – will entail significant 
health benefits to the population of the UK, we run the experiments in the presence of 
(positive) health effects. The effects on welfare of higher health provision come 
through two main channels: (a) the direct gain from increasing the “well-being” of the 
population, and (b) the indirect effects of an increase in the size of the effective (i.e. 
“able to work”) endowments of skilled and unskilled labor for use in non-health 
activities. With respect to the direct gains in well-being, changes in household welfare 
are calculated from private household utility using the Hicksian equivalent variation, to which the changes in public good provisioning are added. With respect to the 
indirect gains in endowments (and so income), separate waiting lists for skilled and 
unskilled labor are introduced, these being a function of a health status variable, itself 
a Cobb Douglas function of NHS and private health consumption. The equations are 
calibrated such that the effective supplies (waiting lists) of skilled and unskilled labor 
are increasing (decreasing) in the health composites, at a decreasing rate. As best and 
rather conservative estimates of the indirect health effects, we use elasticity values of 
0.06 and 0.09 for skilled and unskilled labor respectively, so that a doubling of their 
health status (following from a rise in NHS and/or private health care provisioning) 
will lead to a rise in the effective endowments of skilled and unskilled labor of 6% 
and 9% respectively.
xxi  
Finally, we adjust the model specification to account for the fact that doctors 
and nurses are highly-skilled and specific to the health sector, and therefore immobile 
in the short-run. Doctors and nurses account for approximately 85% of skilled labor 
employed in health care and earn a fixed wage, whereas the remaining 15% of skilled 
labor in the health sector remains mobile and thus earns the market-clearing wage.  
Table 3 and Figure 5 display the changes in household and overall welfare 
resulting from experiment 1, for each of the remittance and wage scenarios, and 
experiment 2.  
INSERT Table 3 and Figure 5 Here 
Experiment 1: Importing Doctors and Nurses at the Current Wage 
In the absence of remittances abroad the specified rise in the NHS budget (of 12.8%), 
which is targeted towards the immigration of foreign health care-specific skilled 
workers, yields a rise in real levels of NHS provisioning of approximately the same 
proportion. The demands for and the domestic production of pharmaceutical products and medical instruments increase by 6.4% and 2.7% respectively. While the wages of 
the domestic and foreign workers of the aforementioned types are sustained at 
benchmark levels, the costs of intermediate inputs of pharmaceuticals, rents on 
capital, and so unit costs of health care rise slightly so that private health care 
contracts (by 0.3%). 
The increase in public health care boosts both the health and the participation 
in the labor market of unskilled labor relative to skilled labor (12.2% relative to 
10.5% and 0.9% relative to 0.5% respectively), as unskilled labor is affected primarily 
by changes in public health care provision, whereas the skilled labor is also affected 
by changes in private health care provision, which is now more costly and less 
available.  
The changes in (effective) factor supplies and sectoral factor demands result in 
a (minor) fall in wages of mobile skilled and unskilled labor, whereas capital rents 
rise slightly. Despite the fall in wages, the higher labor market participation ensures 
that all household incomes from labor rise. Although government income from 
taxation rises, the NHS budget expands by more, so that the government has to reduce 
state benefits to households (by 4.8%). Taking into account that the increase in NHS 
provisioning (and other public goods) in itself constitutes a welfare gain, the 
expansion yields welfare gains for all households except pensioners, who lose by 
0.3% (Table 3). Non-working households, with or without children, gain by 0.2% and 
0.1% respectively, whereas working households, with or without children, gain by 
0.8% and 1.1% respectively. In total, welfare rises by £5.678 billion (a gain of 0.6% 
relative to the original level).  
Accounting for remittances abroad reduces (increases) the previously 
observed income and welfare gains (losses) for households so that overall welfare gains fall to a level of £4.733 billion (0.5% in relative terms) and £3.787 (0.4% in 
relative terms) respectively when 50% or 100% of migrant income is remitted. 
If the government does not maintain the wages of doctors and nurses at pre-
immigration levels, NHS (and private health care) provision levels increase by 
approximately 4.4% at the given NHS budget and in the absence of remittances. This 
is made possible by a fall in wages of doctors and nurses of 12.8%, yielding a fall in 
unit costs of health provisioning by approximately 4.2%. Despite the fall in wages, 
the increase in labor market participation ensures that, with the exception of the 
original domestic doctors and nurses in the UK, the income of all households from 
labor rises. Government transfers to households in the form of state benefits now also 
increase given the rise in government tax revenues, since NHS provision levels 
expand by less. Consequently, all households experience welfare gains, with 
pensioners and non-working households now benefiting relatively more compared to 
the working households (gains in the range of 0.5%-1% for the former compared to 
0.3%-0.4% for the latter). In total, welfare rises by £3.892 billion in the absence of 
remittances (a gain of 0.4% in relative terms), which is less than if the government 
protected the wages of doctors and nurses. This apparently counterintuitive result can 
be explained by the fact that NHS provision levels expand by less if wages of doctors 
and nurses are not sustained, yielding lower indirect welfare gains from increased 
effective, i.e. “able to work”, labor endowments.
xxii Hence, in a second best 
environment in which health care provision is rationed at too low a level from a social 
welfare point of view, wage protection following the immigration of foreign health 
workers is welfare-improving.  
Experiment 2: A Generic Increase in the NHS Budget 
A 12.8% increase in the NHS budget leads to a rise in the real level of NHS 
provisioning of only 8% and, via input-output linkages, increases the demand for and 
domestic production of pharmaceutical products and medical instruments by 3.8% 
and 1.6% respectively. The remainder of the NHS budget is spent on higher wages of 
doctors and nurses, showing increases of 13.3%, which results in higher unit costs and 
hence a contraction in private care of 4.5%.
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As before, the increase in public health care improves the health and 
participation in the labor market of unskilled labor relative to skilled labor (7.4% 
relative to 5.8% and 0.6% relative to 0.3% respectively), as the former is affected 
primarily by changes in public health care, whereas the latter also responds to changes 
in private health care provision, which is more costly and less available.  
Again, the changes in (effective) factor supplies and sectoral factor demands 
result in a (minor) fall in wages of mobile skilled and unskilled labor, whereas capital 
rents rise slightly. Despite this fall in wages, the increase in labor market participation 
ensures that the income from labor rises for all households.  
While experiments 1 and 2 have equal nominal NHS budget implications 
(assuming that in the former the wages of doctors and nurses are maintained at pre-
immigration levels), the income from state benefits falls by relatively more (5.3%) 
compared to experiment 1 since government tax revenue is lower. Consequently, 
household welfare falls for pensioners and non-working households (in the range of 
0.6% to 0.9%) and rises for working households (in the range of 0.4% to 0.8%). In 
total, welfare increases by £1.770 billion (a gain of 0.2% relative to the original level 
of welfare).  The total welfare gains are lower than those observed in experiment 1, even 
when migrant workers remit all income. This result can be explained as a 
consequence of the immigration of doctors and nurses in the first experiment 
addressing the bottleneck of the scarcity of this type of labor in the UK, while 
increasing the NHS budget in the second experiment aggravates it (by putting upward 
pressure on the wages of doctors and nurses). 
 
Sensitivity Analyses 
Sensitivity analyses for the elasticities of substitution and transformation show that 
the results of the counterfactual simulations are relatively robust: although sign 
changes do occur for some variables, the impact of changing the respective elasticities 
upon overall welfare is negligible.  
Varying the health elasticities for skilled and unskilled labor, which govern 
the indirect health effects of improved health on effective labor supplies, does 
however affect the results considerably: generally, in the presence of increasingly 
strong health effects for both skilled and unskilled labor, the expansion of NHS care, 
while drawing away resources from other sectors, yields substantial welfare gains in 
the long-run through increases in effective labor supply and production, and by 
enhancing the tax revenue of the government, which in turn benefits both working 
households (in terms of their wage income) and non-working households (in terms of 
their receipt of state benefits).   
INSERT Table 4 and Figure 6 Here 
Table 4 and Figure 6 report the results of our experiments when we double the 
health elasticities for skilled and unskilled labor. Comparison with Table 3 and Figure 
5 reveals that, given the incidence of illness, if the health sector is twice as efficient in ‘producing’ healthy workers, overall welfare gains increase in the range of 60% to 
90% for immigration at the current wage, in the range of 40% to 70% for immigration 
at the current NHS budget, and by 110% for a generic increase of the NHS budget. 
Further, apart from the latter policy experiment, all households now benefit from the 
policies implemented. 
These results suggest that if we were to employ the model for a different 
country then we could get quite different results, depending on, inter alia, the 
incidence of illness (which determines the number of people treated by the health 
sector and so the number of healthy workers that could be ‘produced’) and the 
‘efficiency’ of the health sector in producing healthy workers.  
At the lower end, welfare gains are guaranteed in experiment 1, even in the 
absence of health effects,
xxiv whereas in experiment 2 welfare rises for relatively low 
values of the health elasticities (of around 0.01 to 0.02 for skilled and unskilled labor 
respectively), so that the main results continue to hold.  
 
4. Conclusions 
This paper seeks to determine the macro-economic impacts of migration of skilled 
medical personnel from a receiving country’s perspective, taking the UK as an 
archetypal OECD economy that imports medical services.  
Using a low dimension diagrammatic analysis of the HOS model, we show 
that under simplifying assumptions (i.e. in certain cases) an expansion of the health 
sector by recruiting immigrant skilled workers in the short-term has favorable 
implications for the outputs of the two tradables sectors compared to an expansion in 
the short-term using only additional domestic unskilled workers and an expansion in 
the long-term using domestic skilled and unskilled workers only. From a formal derivation of the changes in sectoral outputs using the standard 
proportional changes analysis, we show that the impact of an expanding health sector 
on the outputs of non-health sectors in general depends on the sign and magnitude of 
the scale effects of increased effective labor supplies and factor-bias effects of 
changes in the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor. The net effects are generally 
indeterminate in that they depend on the factor intensity rankings and the ‘efficiency’ 
of the health sector in treating and curing sick workers.  
Using an applied CGE model for the UK, importing medical services of 
foreign doctors and nurses yields higher overall welfare gains than does a generic 
increase in the NHS budget, even if all foreign worker income is remitted abroad. The 
immigration of doctors and nurses addresses the bottleneck of the scarcity of this type 
of labor in the UK, while increasing the NHS budget generally aggravates it by 
putting upward pressure on the wages of doctors and nurses. Surprisingly, the 
protection of wages of doctors and nurses in the UK following an influx of foreign 
workers yields higher welfare gains compared to a situation where wages would be 
allowed to fall. This is a consequence of a second best environment created by a 
rationed health care system such as that of the UK, in which the size of the health 
sector is too small from a social welfare point of view due to the presence of positive 
health externalities. 
The foregoing results do not imply that migration is also a desirable policy 
given that many migrant workers come from developing countries, which often need 
their own educated staff.
xxv Indeed, an important direction for future research is to 
apply the framework of this paper to a sending country’s perspective. For notable 
shortage countries that suffer from a high burden of disease (i.e. countries in SSA), 
the gains from remittances may well be insufficient to compensate for losses in terms of the health and the well-being of their populations (i.e. we expect scale effects to be 
large). Further research is necessary to test this proposition. 
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Appendix – The UK CGE model: health and welfare effects 
All sectors are perfectly competitive and multi-product industries. The production 
technologies are Constant Returns to Scale (CRTS), with production a Leontief 
function of intermediates and value-added, itself a Cobb Douglas (CD) function of 
homogeneous factors of production. Household preferences are homothetic, with 
utility a CD function of consumption and savings.  
Cross-border trade is treated using the assumption that the UK is a small open 
economy facing exogenous world prices for imports and exports and accommodates 
‘entrepôt’ trade, i.e. the re-exporting (re-importing) of imported (exported) goods and 
transport and trade margins. In addition, the Armington assumption (Armington, 
1969) is imposed on both production and consumption: goods produced domestically 
are destined for either the domestic market or for the export market, while consumers 
differentiate between domestic and imported varieties of the “same” good. 
Substitution and transformation elasticities are assumed to equal two in this model.
xxvi  
The government uses its revenue from employment, production and 
consumption taxes to finance a fixed expenditure on goods (health care, public 
administration and defense, and other services) and a fixed amount of foreign 
exchange at the exchange rate to accommodate the trade surplus. The remainder of its 
budget is spent on income transfers to households which adjust so as to maintain the 
government account balance. Households allocate the latter income and earnings from 
the supply of capital, skilled and unskilled labor to savings and consumption, 
assuming that only working households save.  
All factor and product markets clear through price adjustments. Equilibrium in 
the capital goods market requires that the value of total savings equals the value of total investments. With the exchange rate as numéraire and the trade balance fixed in 
terms of foreign exchange, investments are savings-driven so that the model closure is 
neoclassical.  
 
Health Provision Effects 
We model the interaction between health care and effective labor supplies by the use 
of a non-participation rate for each type of labor. Non-participation can be interpreted 
as being on the waiting list, whereas participation implies employment in one of the 
sectors of the economy. The effective supply of factor endowments   by households 
, 
 
, is specified in equation (A1), and the waiting list for factor    by h
 h, 
 
WLhf , is displayed in equation (A2).  
f
 h FEhf f ousehold 
  
 
FEhf = Fhf −WLhf       ( A 1 )  
  
 
WLhf =ηf Fhf        ( A 2 )  
where 
   
0<ηf <1 for labor types  f ∈l , l = Skill,Unsk { } ; otherwise (for capital) 
   
ηf = 0
 h
. The waiting list is a fraction of total given factor endowments of household 
 (
 
Fhf ), and is defined positively only for labor ( f ∈l ) whereas capital is always 
fully effective and fully employed.
xxvii 
The fraction of people on the waiting list, the non-participation rate, is 
assumed to be identical across all households and is defined as a constant elasticity 
function of a health composite: 
  
   
      ( A 3 )   ηf ∈l =η0 f HC f
−ε f
where 
   
η0 f ∈l >0 is a scale parameter, which measures the effectiveness of a given 
level of health care in treating and/or curing people and is calibrated so that    
ηf ∈l <1.
xxviii   is a health composite and 
 
HC f ∈l ε f ∈l >0 is the waiting list elasticity, 
which measures the effectiveness of a change in health provisioning in treating and/or 
curing people. The latter is defined as the proportionate change in the size of labor 
type  l ’s waiting list for household   following a change in the health composite,  h
   
ε f ∈l =− ∂ WL f hf ∂HC () ⋅ HC f WLf () >0. 
The health care composite for labor type   is a measure of the ‘healthiness’ or 
health status of this labor type and is a CD function of its public and private health 
care consumption:  
l
0"h   
   
HC f ∈l =G
υ f C"1 h ∑ ( )
(1−υ f )
    ( A 4 )   "10"
where    0≤υl ≤1
"10"
 denotes the share of public health care in the health status of labor 
type   .      denotes health care (commodity “10” in Table 2) provided via the NHS 
- as given by real government consumption of health care, G - and 
l G
j C"10"h h ∑  
represents the level of private health care provisioning - as given by the sum of 
household consumptions,  , of health care. 
 
Cjh
Given equations (A1) to (A4), waiting lists (effective labor supplies) are 
decreasing (increasing) in the health composites, at a decreasing rate. Figure A1 
illustrates (subscripts are ignored for simplicity). 
INSERT Figure A1 Here 
The contribution of public health care to the health status of skilled and 
unskilled labor, as measured by υ , is obtained from Emmerson et al. (2000). Using 
Family Resource Survey data for the period 1994/1995 to 1997/1998, they calculate 
the percentage of adults with private medical insurance by social class. By applying 
population weights corresponding to each social class from the GHS, the proportions of skilled and unskilled labor having private medical insurance are estimated at 16.6% 
and 4% respectively, yielding a residual of 83.4% and 96% of skilled and unskilled 
labor for whom health care is financed via the NHS. The latter serve as proxies for υ .  
The scale parameter    is calibrated to the benchmark non-participation rate. 
Its value is based on the Barmby et al. (2002, 2004) measure of sickness absence, 
calculated as the ratio of the number of hours absent due to sickness to the number of 
hours contracted to work. Using Labour Force Survey data, the authors find a fairly 
stable long-run average for the (yearly) sickness absence rate in the UK of around 
3.20%. These and other studies
η0
xxix find that sickness absence varies by socio-
economic characteristics. Illness-related absence from work is approximately 1.5 
times higher for manual than that for non-manual workers. Assuming that the non-
participation rate in the base year for unskilled workers is 1.5 times that of skilled 
workers and postulating an overall non-participation rate of 3.20% yields   = 2.89% 
for skilled and 
η0
0 η = 4.34% for unskilled workers.  
The waiting list elasticity parameter, ε , is set to 2 for both labor types, so that 
a 10% increase in health status leads to a 20% decrease in waiting lists. A value of 2 
seems reasonable since it gives health elasticities for skilled and unskilled labor of 
around 0.1 (0.06 and 0.09 for skilled and unskilled labor respectively), consistent with 




The effects on welfare of higher health provision are two-fold: it directly increases the 
“well-being” of the population and indirectly improves welfare by increasing the size 
of the effective (i.e. “able to work”) endowments of skilled and unskilled labor for use 
in non-health activities. Accordingly, changes in household welfare are calculated from private household utility using the Hicksian equivalent variation, to which the 
benefits from changes in public good provisioning (including NHS care) are added. 











0      ( A 5 )  
where   and    denote household utility and income respectively, and superscript 0 
and 1 respectively refer to the equilibria before and after a particular shock occurs.  
Uh Yh
Assuming that each household receives a share αGjh  of the change in the real 
government consumption of good  j  (where 0≤αGjh αGjh =1 ≤1,
h
∑ ), the overall 
change in household welfare becomes: 
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Consequently, overall welfare changes are equal to: 





Welfare changes related to public good provisioning are allocated to households in 
proportions 
 
αGjh , which for health care correspond to each household’s share of the 
total number of NHS general practitioner consultations and for other goods (public 
administration and defense, and other services respectively) correspond to each 
household’s share in the population. The resulting parameter estimates, including 
































































































































































































































Figure 6. Changes in Household Welfare if the Health Sector is Twice as Efficient  
 
 
Figure A1. Waiting Lists and Effective Endowments 
 
  Sector 1  Sector 2 












12 HE s ss s >> >
*  1 ˆ 0 S X >   1 ˆ 0 F X <   +/-  2 ˆ 0 S X <   2 ˆ 0 F X >   -/+ 
12 HE s ss s >> >  1 ˆ 0 S X >   1 ˆ 0 F X <   +/-  2 ˆ 0 S X >   2 ˆ 0 F X >   2 ˆ 0 X >  
1 EH2 s sss >>>   1 ˆ 0 S X >   1 ˆ 0 F X <   +/-  2 ˆ 0 S X >   2 ˆ 0 F X <   -/+ 
1 HE2 s sss >>>   1 ˆ 0 S X >   1 ˆ 0 F X <   +/-  2 ˆ 0 S X >   2 ˆ 0 F X <   -/+ 
12 EH s sss >>>  1 ˆ 0 S X >   1 ˆ 0 F X >   1 ˆ 0 X >   2 ˆ 0 S X >   2 ˆ 0 F X <   -/+ 
12EH s sss >>>  1 ˆ 0 S X <   1 ˆ 0 F X >   -/+  2 ˆ 0 S X >   2 ˆ 0 F X <   +/- 
* where  jj j SU = 1, 2, , jH E =  for       s
 











Factors of Production (f)  Sectors (i) / Commodities (j) 
Skill     Skilled  1.  Primary 
Unsk    Unskilled  2.  Pharmaceuticals 
Cap      Capital  3.  Medical instruments 
  4.  Other manufacturing 
Households (h)  5.  Energy 
Hse1 Pensioners  6.    Construction 
Hse2  Non-working, children  7.  Distribution & transport 
Hse3  Non-working, no children  8.  Finance 
Hse4  Working, children  9.  Public administration & defense 
Hse5  Working, no children  10. Health care 
 11.  Other  services 
 
Table 2. The CGE Model Classifications 
 
 





*  Overall 
-572  47  50  2211  3942  5678  0% 
(-0.27)  (0.18)  (0.11)  (0.75)  (1.07)  (0.60) 
-695  32  31  1906  3459  4733  50% 
(-0.33)  (0.12)  (0.07)  (0.65)  (0.94)  (0.50) 
-818  16  12  1602  2975  3787 
1 
10% immigration of 
doctors and nurses at 
current wage (12.8% 
increase in NHS budget)  100% 
(-0.38)  (0.06)  (0.03)  (0.55)  (0.81)  (0.40) 
1127  262  309  1164  1030  3892  0% 
(0.53)  (0.98)  (0.68)  (0.40)  (0.28)  (0.41) 
1023  249  293  896  602  3064  50% 
(0.48)  (0.93)  (0.64)  (0.31)  (0.16)  (0.32) 
920  237  278  629  174  2236 
1 
10% immigration of 
doctors and nurses at 
current NHS budget 
(wages fall by 12.8%)  100% 
(0.43)  (0.88)  (0.61)  (0.21)  (0.05)  (0.24) 
-1710  -228  -266  1042  2932  1770  2 
Generic rise in NHS budget (12.8%)  (-0.80)  (-0.85)  (-0.58)  (0.36)  (0.79)  (0.19) 
*{HSE1,2,3,4,5} =
 {Pensioner, Non-Working With Children, Non-Working Without Children, 
Working  With Children, Working Without Children} Households 
 
Table 3. Welfare Changes in £ mln. (%) Measured by Equivalent Variation 





*  Overall 
330  162  239  3180  5086  8997  0% 
(0.15)  (0.61)  (0.52)  (1.09)  (1.38)  (0.95) 
209  147  221  2877  4604  8058  50% 
(0.10)  (0.55)  (0.48)  (0.98)  (1.25)  (0.85) 
88  132  202  2574  4121  7117 
1 
10% immigration of 
doctors and nurses at 
current wage (12.8% 
increase in NHS budget)  100% 
(0.04)  (0.49)  (0.44)  (0.88)  (1.12)  (0.75) 
1611  324  409  1622  1534  5499  0% 
(0.76)  (1.21)  (0.89)  (0.55)  (0.42)  (0.58) 
1511  311  394  1358  1110  4685  50% 
(0.71)  (1.16)  (0.86)  (0.46)  (0.30)  (0.49) 
1412  299  378  1094  686  3870 
1 
10% immigration of 
doctors and nurses at 
current NHS budget 
(wages fall by 12.8%)  100% 
(0.66)  (1.12)  (0.83)  (0.37)  (0.19)  (0.41) 
-1060  -146  -133  1652  3604  3917  2 
Generic rise in NHS budget (12.8%)  (-0.50)  (-0.55)  (-0.29)  (0.56)  (0.98)  (0.41) 
*{HSE1,2,3,4,5} =
 {Pensioner, Non-Working With Children, Non-Working Without Children, Working  With 
Children, Working Without Children} Households 
 






 αTRh   Public administration 
and defense 
Health care  Other services 
Pensioners  0.523  0.176  0.251  0.176 
Non-Working, 
Children 
0.102  0.064  0.087  0.064 
Non-Working,  
No Children 
0.106  0.054  0.076  0.054 
Working,  
Children 
0.234  0.370  0.306  0.370 
Working,  
No Children 
0.035  0.336  0.280  0.336 
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i   Exceptions are countries such as India and the Philippines, which have collaborative 
health-worker migration schemes and are reported to over-produce physicians and nurses 
intended for an international market. According to Bhatnagar (2004) and Lorenzo et al. 
(2007), these countries are nonetheless also reported to suffer from shortages locally. 
ii   This is especially true for countries with wider policy failures, e.g. in SSA. According to 
Eastwood et al. (2005) in countries with better opportunities, such as India, some health 
workers do return. 
iii   Dixon et al. (2002) for example reports a HIV/AIDS prevalence rate of 20% for South 
African nurses. Moreover, Dovlo (2007) notes that worries of contracting HIV in the 
workplace is likely to further induce increased migration of nurses from SSA. 
iv   According to the Code of Practice, the UK limits recruitment to countries with which it has 
signed a health worker migration agreement, most notably India and the Philippines. See 
Buchan (2007) for its impact on international nurse recruitment. 
v   GATS Mode 4, by which services can be traded via the movement of natural persons, 
governs the provision of health services by individuals in another country on a temporary 
basis. 
vi   The paper is part of a broader research project examining the effects of the medical brain 
drain on both receiving countries and sending countries, which is a follow-up of the 
author’s Ph.D. thesis (Rutten, 2004). A shortened version of the paper has been published 
in the Review of International Economics (Rutten, 2008). See Rutten (2007) for an 
overview of the literature. 
vii   Iregui (2003), Walmsley and Winters (2003), Winters (2003), Winters et al. (2003) and 
World Bank (2005), all use CGE modeling to quantify the impact of increased   40
                                                                                                                                                             
international migration. The first study in this field, by Hamilton and Whalley (1984), is 
based on a partial equilibrium analysis and is updated by Moses and Letnes (2003, 2004). 
There are, as far as we know, no applied CGE models on the economic impacts of medical 
migration. 
viii   Here there may also benefits such as remittances and  ‘brain gain’ generated by a rise in the 
expected return on education for those staying behind, resulting in additional investment in 
education. Schiff (2006), however, shows that claims about the size and impact of the brain 
gain on welfare and growth are greatly exaggerated and that brain drain is likely to just 
entail a welfare loss for developing source countries. Kangasniemi et al. (2007) arrives at 
the same conclusion based on evidence from the UK. The evidence on whether remittances 
outweigh the welfare losses of human capital in source countries is also mixed, though 
generally in shortage countries the health sector is considered to be at a loss since 
remittances benefit the economy as a whole and are unlikely to flow back into the health 
sector, especially when it is poorly functioning.  
ix   A point also made by Bhatnagar (2004). Taking the example of the health sector, one may 
well expect the health and welfare gains of an influx of skilled health workers into 
developed countries with relatively well-functioning health care systems to be insufficient 
to compensate for the adverse health and welfare consequences of the (permanent) loss of 
already scarce skilled health workers for developing countries where (well-) functioning 
health care systems are lacking and where the burden of disease is relatively high.  
x   Characterized by the assumptions of two goods, two factors that are perfectly mobile 
within each country but immobile between countries, perfect competition and constant 
returns to scale. 
xi   An important corollary is that an exogenous equiproportionate increase in the endowments 
of both factors will lead to the same proportionate increase in the output of both sectors.   41
                                                                                                                                                             
Since any increase in both factor endowments can be decomposed into an 
equiproportionate increase in both endowments and an increase in the endowment of one 
of the factors, we have the more general result that the output of one sector must increase 
while the change in the output of the other is in general indeterminate. 
xii   In this setting the migration option is more expensive than the option of using domestic 
unskilled workers only. If wages of domestic health-specific workers were not maintained, 
the numbers of unskilled workers employed in the health sector vs. the tradables sectors, 
and hence sectoral outputs, would depend on, among others, the elasticity of substitution 
between health-specific skilled and unskilled labor in the health sector. So, if both options 
involved an identical health care budget increase, it would be unclear which option would 
perform better in terms of tradables outputs. 
xiii   Note that at least one of the three sectors must have a skilled/unskilled ratio that is higher 
(lower) than the skilled/unskilled effective endowment ratio. 
xiv   By assumption sector 1 is more skill-intensive than sector 2. 
xv   Specifically, prices of health care and health-specific skilled workers become endogenous 
and the cost share of health-specific skilled workers, the substitution elasticity between this 
type and unskilled workers in the health sector, and the ratio of unskilled workers 
employed in the health and tradables sectors become additional unknowns.  
xvi   Associated publications are Office for National Statistics (2002, 2001) respectively. 
xvii   An outline of the model is given in the appendix. All MPSGE model files are available 
from http://www.i4ide.org/people/~rutten/.   
xviii  A reliable estimate of the share of foreign worker income remitted abroad cannot be 
obtained since the evidence on remittances by migrant workers itself is mixed and difficult 
to establish for three main reasons: (1) a large proportion of remittances is transferred 
informally and is therefore not recorded in official statistics; (2) remittance behavior will   42
                                                                                                                                                             
depend on the characteristics of the migrants in question, for example, the skill type, 
income level, length of stay and the country of origin and (3) it is unclear how much of the 
remittance flows can actually be attributed to health workers.  
xix  In contrast with the standard neoclassical CGE model closure, in which the current account 
balance is fixed and assumed equal to the capital balance, the modeling of migration and 
associated remittances implies that the trade balance has to adjust so as to maintain the 
balance of payments. Note that our model does not explicitly account for other components 
of the capital account, since it is focused on the consequences of international trade (in 
services) on the domestic economy.  
xx   Note that the two policy experiments will differ in terms of their real budgetary impact due 
to differential price effects. In addition, in a setup where, given the NHS budget, wages of 
doctors and nurses are allowed to fall following immigration, the comparability with a 
generic NHS budget increase logically breaks down, immigration being essentially costless 
since the NHS budget does not have to increase to accommodate an increase in NHS 
provision levels. 
xxi   See also the appendix.  
xxii   If indirect welfare effects are absent, overall welfare gains would actually be higher (by 
£333 million, or 0.04%, in the absence of remittances). 
xxiii  Note that if all skilled labor were perfectly mobile, NHS production would increase by 
12.8% and private health care would contract only slightly, by 0.4%. Total welfare would 
increase by £3.033 billion, a relative gain of 0.3%. The presence of health care-specific 
skilled labor thus constrains the production expansion of health care and related sectors, 
the health of the population, and effective labor supplies, and so yields lower overall 
welfare gains, cutting total welfare gains by 42%.    43
                                                                                                                                                             
   
xxiv  If wages of doctors and nurses are sustained and all migrant income is remitted abroad, a 
slight (0.003%) decrease in overall welfare is observed. 
xxv   Moreover, one may argue that in the long-term the only sustainable policy which addresses 
the root cause of the shortage of medical personnel is to increase the number of medical 
school places in the UK 
xxvi  The majority of goods produced in the UK is traded with similar high-income countries 
and are of the same high quality so that substitution and transformation elasticities are 
reasonably high. At the multi-commodity level elasticity values in GTAP version 5 
(http://www.gtap.org) are around 2 to 2.5. 
xxvii  This does of course ignore the loss in effective capital when, for instance, machines break 
down. However, the cost of repairing a machine is internal to the firm, and is assumed to 
be assimilated into the cost of capital services, whereas the repair (treatment) of ill workers 
is a cost to the state or to the worker’s insurers. 





   
η0 f ∈l    
ε f ∈l = 0
   
∂FEhf ∂HC f
 as  , but that the upper constraint for   is not 
automatically satisfied.   also measures the non-participation rate for  . 
Health care is then completely ineffective (i.e. does not cure people) and therefore does not 
affect waiting lists. 
xxix  See for example the Confederation of British Industry (2001) and Barham and Leonard 
(2002) for an overview. 
xxx   Folland et al. (2001, p.108-109). These elasticities measure the proportionate change in the 
size of effective endowments of skilled and unskilled labor following a change in the 












⎠ . The elasticity is   44
                                                                                                                                                             
higher for unskilled labor due to the fact that a relatively higher proportion of the unskilled 
suffer illness, so that health expenditure’s “leverage” is greater for this labor type. 
xxxi  Note that private health care is already included in the utility function and thus in welfare. 
The current and, for the purpose of this analysis, more appropriate welfare specification 
postulates that an increase in the provision of public health care (and other goods) 
constitutes a direct welfare gain. Also, the resulting overall welfare measure, displayed in 
equation (A7), is equivalent to a social welfare function with equal weights, i.e. a common 
utilitarian social welfare function (Johansson, 1991, p.32). 
 
 